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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELMER 0. ALLEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
— vs.— 
FEDERATED DAIRY FARMS, 
INC., and ALBERTSON'S, INC., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by the Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Elmer 0. Allen against Respondents, Federated Diary 
Farms, Inc., and Albertson's, Inc., for injuries arising 
from a slip and fall accident involving cottage cheese on 
a floor in Albertson's store. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court for Weber County, the Hon-
orable Ronald 0. Hyde, presiding, granted to both 
Defendant-Respondents, their respective motions for 
summary judgments and judgment was entered in favor 
of each Defendant-Respondent upon the grounds that 
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Federated Dairy Farms or Albertson's and that there 
was no evidence of how the cottage cheese got on the 
floor, by whom it was deposited, how long it had been 
there, or that either Defendant knew of its presence be-
fore the accident and that the facts, established by the 
depositions of the Appellant, and Appellant's wife, an 
employee of Albertson's, and an employee of Federated 
Dairy Farms, fall directly within the Utah Supreme 
Court cases of Long vs. Smith Food King and Cream 
O'Weber Dairy, Utah 2d , (filed October 4, 
1973), 531 P.2d 360; Koer vs. Mayfair Markets, 19 Utah 
2d 339, 431 P.2d 566; Howard vs. Auerbach Company, 
20 Utah 2d 355, 437 P.2d 895, and Lindsay vs. Eccles 
Hotel Company, 3 Utah 2d 364, 284 P.2d 447. 
BELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Eespondents seek an affirmation of the Trial 
Court's decision granting their respective motions for 
summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's statement of facts does not fully set 
forth the facts established by the depositions of the Ap-
pellant, the Appellant's wife and others, and, further-
more, leaves out vital testimony of the Appellant and 
his wife having a bearing upon this case. 
Respondents jointly submit this brief and the fol-
lowing statement of facts: 
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On March 3, 1973, between two o'clock and three 
o'clock p.m., Appellant and his wife entered Albertson's 
store to shop and had been in the store approximately 
thirty minutes (R.42, pp.5-6) when Appellant allegedly 
slipped and fell on some cottage cheese which was on 
the floor. 
Before the fall, the Appellant and his wife had 
walked up and down every aisle within the store and 
neither had seen any cottage cheese on the floor (R.43, 
p.4, 6; R.42, pp.9-10, 15 with Exhibit " A " — diagram 
at end of deposition). 
Neither the Appellant nor his wife know how the 
cottage cheese got on the floor (R. 42, p.15; R.43, p.7). 
Neither the Appellant nor his wife know how long 
the cottage cheese had been on the floor before the fall 
(R.42, p.15; R.43, p.7). 
The employee of Federated Dairy, Nadine Blanch-
ard, who was handing out samples of cottage cheese, 
regularly checked the floors and never saw any cottage 
cheese on the floor prior to the accident, and did not see 
the cottage cheese in question before the accident (R.46, 
Blanchard Dep. p.19, 22). The said employee did not 
see the Plaintiff fall but was looking in the opposite 
direction at the time (R.46, Blanchard Dep., p.14). 
The employee of Albertson's, Mr. Sage, saw no cot-
tage cheese anywhere on the floor of the store on the 
day of the accident prior to the Appellant's fall (R.46, 
Sage Dep., p.18, 26). He did not see the cottage cheese 
3 
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in question before the accident and does not know how 
the same got upon the floor (R.46, Sage Dep., p.28). 
The Appellant does not know of anyone who saw 
the cottage cheese on the floor before he fell (R.42, p.15). 
On the day of the accident, small samples of cottage 
cheese were being given away to those customers of the 
store who desired them. The samples consisted of a 
small amount of cottage cheese placed upon a cracker 
measuring approximately one inch square (R.46, Blanch-
ardDep., p.12). 
The employee of Albertson's does not know the 
source of the cottage cheese upon which the Appellant 
allegedly slipped and fell. It could have been dropped 
by a customer who obtained the same from the dairy 
case or from the demonstration area. He does not know 
how the cottage cheese got upon the floor or how long 
it had been there (R.46, Sage Dep., p.28, 29-30). 
Appellant's brief at page 3 leaves an erroneous im-
pression that unwanted samples of cottage cheese were 
found in the store after the accident. However, the 
record shows the contrary to be true. No cottage cheese 
was found in the store subsequent to the accident (R.46, 
Sage Dep., p.23, line 21-24). 
Appellant's brief at page 3 claims there was no pro-
cedure for inspection and clean-up, however the record 
indicates otherwise. It was uncommon for people to 
spill on the floor (R.46, Blanchard Dep., p.5-6), but in 
4 
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any case she walked around the store three or four times 
during the shift to check the floor (E.46, p.19) and at 
no time saw any cottage cheese upon the floor (E.46, 
Blanchard Dep., p.22). 
AEGUMENT 
POINT I 
THEEE IS NO EVIDENCE •>!• NEGLI-
GENCE ON THE PAET OF THE EESPON-
DENTS. 
The law is well-established in Utah, as it is in most 
other jurisdictions, that an injured Plaintiff who slips 
and falls on substance on a commercial floor, must es-
tablish either that the defendant placed the substance 
upon the floor, or that the substance was on the floor 
for such a length of time that the defendant knew of or 
reasonably could have discovered and removed it. 
The Utah Supreme Court case of Long vs. Smith 
Food King and Cream 0'Weber Dairy, Utah 2d 
(filed October 4, 1973), 531 P.2d 360, is directly in 
point and nearly identical to the case at bar. In that 
case, a Cream O'Weber Dairy demonstrator was hand-
ing out samples of pumpkin pie and whipped cream, on 
one inch square butter pads. The Plaintiff slipped and 
fell upon pumpkin pie and whipped cream in the Smith 
Food King store. The Plaintiff had been shopping with 
his wife and both testified that they had seen no other 
pumpkin pie on the floor before the fall. Neither the 
Plaintiff nor his wife knew how the pie got upon the 
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floor or how long it had been there. The demonstrator 
did not see the pie on the floor before the accident. The 
Trial Court granted summary judgment upon the ground 
that there was no evidence as to how the pie got on the 
floor, by whom it was deposited, when it arrived there 
or that the Defendants had any knowledge of its pres-
ence. The Plaintiff appealed to the Utah Supreme Court 
which affirmed the summary judgments holding that the 
basic rules of Howard vs. Auerbach Company, Koer vs. 
May fair Markets, and Lindsay vs. Eccles Hotel Company, 
supra, should apply. The Supreme Court further held 
that the giving away of samples was an essential part 
of the operation of super markets and a well-known and 
widely practiced method of merchandising and that the 
same rules should apply as to the other operations of 
the super market. 
In Howard vs. Auerbach Company, 20 Utah 2d 355, 
437 P.2d 895, a customer slipped on some oil on the es-
calator in the store and fell injuring herself. Summary 
judgment in favor of Auerbach's was affirmed by the 
Utah Supreme Court which stated: 
. . .the record is devoid of any indication who put 
any oil on the steps of the escalator or, if so, it 
was for such a time that the store people reason-
ably could have discovered and removed it. 
The Court further stated that the Auerbach case 
fell directly within the law enunciated in Koer vs. May-
fair Markets, supra. 
In Koer vs. Map fair Markets, 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 
P.2d 566, a customer slipped and fell on a grape on the 
6 
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floor of the store. The customer alleged that the store 
manager had passed by the spot where the accident oc-
curred just prior to the accident and, therefore, either 
had actual knowledge or constructive notice of the pres-
ence of the substance on the floor and should have re-
moved it. The Trial Court granted a judgment not with-
standing the verdict which was affirmed by the Utah 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court stated: 
We concede that the grape on the floor was a 
dangerous condition and that the plaintiff slipped 
and fell by reason of such condition. But we are 
not able from the evidence to find any support 
for the( further and necessary inference that this 
condition was caused by an act of the defendant, 
or that the defendant had actual or constructive 
knowledge of it. We just cannot ignore the fact 
that the grape was only seen after the fall oc-
'<••••.: curred. From these circumstances alone a jury 
could not be justified in inferring that the grape 
had been there for such a period of time that, 
had the defendant exercised reasonable care, he 
should have known of its presence. Furthermore, 
there was testimony at trial that others were 
shopping in the aisle. It is quite possible that 
one of them dropped the grape on the floor after 
the manager passed by. There may have been 
any number of reasons, including legitimate pre-
occupation with other problems than whether 
there was a grape on the floor, or that other 
shoppers may have blocked his view, as to why 
the manager did not see it. It seems unfair to 
permit even a jury with its admittedly broad 
prerogatives, to conclude on the one hand that 
it was the manager's duty and that he must have 
seen it, but on the other, that it was not the 
plaintiff's duty and she was excused from doing 
so. 
7 
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The Court in the Koer case recognized and followed 
the rale set down in Lindsay vs. Eccles Hotel Company, 
3 Utah 2d 364, 284 P.2d 477. In that case, a coffee shop 
patron slipped and fell on water which was present on 
the floor of the coffee shop. The Supreme Court held 
that the coffee shop owner would not be liable to a pa-
tron in absence of showing how or when water got on to 
the floor or that the owner had knowledge of its pres-
ence. 
The Court stated: 
. . .although the evidence indicated that a waitress 
delivered water in glasses to plaintiff and her 
v
 companion, there is no evidence as to whether the 
waitress, the plaintiff, her companion, other pa-
trons or persons spilled the water on the floor, 
•':*> or exactly when it was spilled, or whether the 
management knew of its existence. In other 
words, there was no evidence as to how the water 
/ ! got on the floor, by whom it was deposited, exact-
ly when it arrived there or that the defendant 
had knowledge of its presence. Under such cir-
cumstances, a jury cannot be permitted to specu-
late that the defendant was negligent. 
In Morgan vs. American Meat Company, 46 N.E.2d 
669 (Ohio 1942), samples of olives were being given 
away to customers in defendant's store. One customer 
slipped on an olive and fell injuring herself. There was 
no evidence that the storekeeper knew the olive was on 
the floor or how long it had been there and the Court 
granted defendant a directed verdict. 
In the course of its decision, the Court in the above 
case stated: 
8 
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The giving away of articles of food in grocery 
stores, as samples, has long been a recognized 
method of advertising and there is no rule of 
law which will charge the merchant with knowl-
edge that the customers will dispose of what re-
mains of the sample in such a way as to make 
the store dangerous to other customers. 
In the case at bar, the Appellant and his wife, be-
fore the accident, had been in the store thirty minutes, 
including the area where cottage cheese samples were 
being given away, and the Appellant and his wife had 
walked up and down every aisle within the store and at 
no time did they see any cottage cheese on the floor. 
The only cottage cheese ever observed by anyone was 
that small portion upon which the Appellant claims he 
slipped, and this was after the fall. And, it is unknown 
how that particular portion got on to the floor, or how 
long it had been on the floor before the fall. 
The demonstrator did not see any cottage cheese 
at any time before the accident. 
The employee of the store did not see any cottage 
cheese on the floor on the day of the accident. 
The particular cottage cheese in question could have 
been dropped by any customer merely seconds before the 
Appellant fell. 
There is no evidence as to how the cottage cheese 
got on the floor, by whom it was deposited, when it 
arrived there or that the Kespondents had any knowl-
9 
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edge of its presence. Under such circumstances, a jury 
cannot be permitted to speculate that the Respondents 
were negligent. It would be impossible for a jury to de-
termine whether or not there was negligence on the part 
of either Respondent without such speculation and this 
would be contrary to the well-established laws of this 
state. 
The Appellant has cited as authority several cases 
from other jurisdictions which have no application here. 
For instance, Appellant cites JasJco vs. Woolworth, 494 
P.2d 839 (Colorado) where pizza was sold for consump-
tion on the premises. However, the facts there indicated 
that there was constant debris on the floor where the 
pizza was sold and this constant debris was known to 
the manager before the accident. In our case, there was 
no cottage cheese any place in the store or even by the 
demonstration table before the accident and nothing to 
put the Respondents on notice of the particular1 cottage 
cheese upon which Appellant fell. 
Appellant also cites Ma/ageri vs. Great Atlanta and 
Pacific Tea Company, 357 F.2d 202 (New Jersey, 1966) 
where a customer in a grocery store fell on vegetable 
leaves located in front of the produce counter which had 
slanted racks wherein the Court found that the actions 
of the store owner in the manner in which he displayed 
vegetables caused a dangerous condition on the floor of 
which he should have been aware. However, in the case 
at bar there is no evidence of any actions on the part 
of the store owner or the demonstrator which caused 
10 
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cottage cheese to be upon the floor. In fact, the con-
trary is true. No cottage cheese was seen any place upon 
the floor in this store on the day of the accident. 
The only other case cited by the Appellant was Lit-
tle vs. Butner, 186 Kansas 75, 348 P.2d 1022 (1960) a 
case involving meat samples given to customers which 
actually created a slippery condition upon the floor 
which the Kansas Court held was such that the store 
owner knew of the condition or should have known. 
However, in the case at bar, we have no such slippery 
condition. In fact, the contrary is true. Both the Ap-
pellant and his wife testified that they walked up and 
down every aisle in the store for one-half an hour be-
fore the accident and saw no cottage cheese or crackers 
any place upon the floor. The floor was clean. And, 
the demonstrator and store employee both testified that 
they saw no cottage cheese on the floor on the day of 
the accident. The only cottage cheese ever seen on the 
floor was that which the Appellant claims he slipped on 
and that could have been dropped by a customer seconds 
before the Appellant arrived at that spot. 
It is respectfully submitted that there is no evidence 
of negligence on the part of either Respondent and that 
the Trial Court's decision granting both motions for 
summary judgment should be affirmed. 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II 
THE GRANTING OF A MOTION FOR SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER WHERE 
THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF ANY 
MATERIAL FACT. 
The depositions of the Appellant, the Appellant's 
wife, the store manager and the cottage cheese demon-
strator have been taken and all parties have had an op-
portunity of full cross-examination. There are no other 
known witnesses or other evidence to shed light upon 
this matter. All available facts are now before the Court 
and clearly indicate that there are no genuine issues of 
any material fact remaining to be tried and that the sum-
mary judgment was proper. 
All witnesses and parties agree that it is unknown 
how the cottage cheese got on to the floor or how long 
it had been there before the accident. All witnesses and 
parties agree that no cottage cheese was seen any place 
on the floor of the store before or after the accident 
except for that small amount upon which Appellant 
slipped. 
Rule 56 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
concerning summary judgment provides: 
. . .The judgment sought shall be rendered forth-
with if the pleadings, depositions, answers to in-
terrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a mat-
ter of law... 
12 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that there is no evidence 
of any negligence on the part of the Respondents and 
that the Trial Court did not err in granting both Re-
spondents' motions for summary judgment and that the 
same should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON, WADSWORTH & RUSSON 
By LEONARD H. RUSSON 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
Federated Dairy Farms, Inc. 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
DANIEL A. ALSUP 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
Albertson's Inc. 
1101 First Security Bank Building 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed in the United 
tates Postal Service, copies of the foregoing 
ESPONDENTS1 BRIEF this 17th day of April, 1975, 
o the following parties: 
Richard H. Thornley, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
2610 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Daniel A. Alsup, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Respondent Albertson's, Inc. 
1101 First Security Bank Building 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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